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I. Before the Tax Court
A. Audit: anticipate litigation always, track
IDR's, be careful about engaging experts, etc.
B. Appeals
1. To go or not to go?
2. Go before or after filing in Tax Court?
3. Strategy
C. Selection of forum
1. Payment of tax
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2. Interest
3. Discovery
4. Closing limitations
5. Generalist or specialist judge
6. Jury
7. Management of large cases
8. Precedents
9. Time to trial and decision
10. Appealing adverse decision
11. Differences not readily apparent
II. Pretrial in the Tax Court
A. Petition
B. Motions
C. Discovery
D. Experts: engagement, reports, etc.
E. Burden of proof
F. Transferee liability
III. Trial in the Tax Court
A. Time and place of trial
B. Assignment of judge
C. Bifurcated trials
920381 / 8-25-93
D. Pretrial memorandum: facts, theories, law,
witness disclosure, etc.
E. Expert reports
F. Opening statements
G. Witnesses: choice, sequence, etc.
H. Exhibits
I. Visual aids: charts, videos, tangible objects, etc.
J. Rebuttal witnesses
K. Making a record
IV. Posttrial in the Tax Court
A. Record
B. Briefs
C. Findings of fact
D. Opinion
E. Rule 155
F. Attorneys fees
G. Decision
H. Appeal: pay or file bond
V. Settlement
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The attached problem raises numerous questions concerning
burden of proof, presumptions, and trial strategy that arise in a
Tax Court case. Consider how you would answer each hypothetical.
Franklin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-184, copy attached, may
suggest some answers.
PROBLEM
Facts:
Respondent ("R" for short) has been investigating a certain
taxpayer, Slick Willie the Peddler ("Slick" for short), for quite
some time. R's examination has not progressed nearly as far as she
had hoped. The period of limitations for issuing a notice of
deficiency for 1991 (the year under examination) has all but
expired. R has discovered the following:
(1) In 1977, Slick was convicted in the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland of conspiracy to distribute
heroin. Slick pled guilty to conspiracy and subsequently was
sentenced to a 12-year. prison term. Slick was released on parol in
1986;
(2) On July 17, 1991, petitioner was indicted by a Federal
grand jury on 28 counts of narcotics and Internal Revenue Code
violations. Petitioner pled guilty to counts 9 and 12 of the
indictment and is currently serving a nonparolable sentence of
10 years.
Count 12 charged petitioner with willfully failing to include
in his 1990 Federal income tax return gross income and expenses from
the business of distributing heroin and with aiding and abetting.
Count nine charged petitioner as follows:
A. From April 1989 up to the date of this
Indictment, in the State and District of Maryland,
defendant
SLICK WILLIE THE PEDDLER
did unlawfully violate Title 21, United States Code,
Section 841(a) (1), which violations, including, but not
limited to, those set forth in Counts One, Two, Three,
Four, Five, and Eight of this Indictment, were part of a
continuing series of violations of said statute
undertaken by the said Defendant in concert with at
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least five other persons, and from which continuing
series of violations SLICK WILLIE THE PEDDLER obtained
substantial income and resources.
B. From his engagement in the aforesaid Continuing
Criminal Enterprise, the Defendant SLICK WILLIE THE
PEDDLER obtained property, profits and interests which
are subject to forfeiture to the United States. $44,080
in United States currency was seized from SLICK WILLIE
THE PEDDLER's home in Baltimore, Maryland, on June 15,
1991, by agents of the United States, on suspicion of
being profits of* the Continuing Criminal Enterprise. 21
U.S.C. Section 848.
The counts referred to in count nine charged petitioner as follows:
Count one charged petitioner with conspiring to distribute heroin
from at least April 1989 to the date of the indictment. Counts two
through four charged petitioner with distributing approximately 50-
dosage unit bags of heroin on each of four occasions in Maryland
during a period beginning in April 1989 and ending in June 1991.
Count eight charged distribution of 1500-dosage unit bags of heroin
in Maryland on or before October 7, 1990. Section 848 of Title 21,
U.S.C., whose violation forms the gravamen of count nine, is
commonly known as the "Drug Kingpin Statute".
Hypothetical #1:
R has a big problem. She strongly believes that Slick had a
lot of drug income in 1991 and wants to issue him a notice of
deficiency for that year. However, she cannot write "a lot" of
unreported income on the deficiency notice: she needs a number. R
remembers seeing a movie recently where a druglord bragged about
earning $400,000 a year. That figure seems as good as any other,
and R issues a notice of deficiency determining that Slick had
$400,000 of receipts from drug sales in 1991. The deficiency notice
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allows no cost of goods sold or other expenses, determining
unreported income of $400,000.
At trial, the Judge points out that the taxpayer has the burden
of proof. The taxpayer normally argues first, to make his case.
Slick's tax attorney stands up and asks the Court: "How could I
possibly prove that Slick didn't have $400,000 of unreported income
from drug sales. I don't have any witnesses who saw him not receive
the money." Slick's attorney then remembers something useful:
"Your honor, it is well established that, where a deficiency notice
is "arbitrary", respondent must go forward with the evidence.'
Granted, my client sold a few drugs in 1991, However, R has offered
no justification whatever for the $400,000 figure. For all we know,
its her lucky number. R's deficiency notice is arbitrary. I
respectfully submit that, if R presents no evidence, R fails to
sustain her burden of proof, and my client wins." Slick's attorney
then sits down. R presents proof of the above-stated facts, but no
evidence as to why the $400,000 figure (as opposed to some other)
represents Slick's unreported income. R rests her case.
Is R's deficiency notice arbitrary? If so, has R successfully
come forward with evidence? How much unreported income, if any,
should the Court find?
Hypothetical #2
The Court, impressed that Slick sold lots of drugs in 1991 (and
may well have hidden his profits from the tax-man), concludes that
You may assume that this assertion by Slick's attorney is
correct.
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(1) R's deficiency notice is not arbitrary, and (2) R does not have
the burden of going forward with the evidence. Because Slick has
the burden of proof, and has given the Court no reason to believe he
did not have $400,000 of unreported drug income, the Court sustains
R's deficiency determination.
Suppose that R also had determined that at least some part of
Slick's underpayment was fraudulent. As you may know, R must prove
fraud by clear and convincing evidence. To make that proof, R must
show (by clear and convincing evidence) that (1) there was at least
some underpayment,2 and (2) such underpayment was motivated by an
intent to avoid tax (as opposed to being in error). Slick concedes
that, if there was an underpayment, it was fraudulent.
Now that the burden of proof is on R (by clear and convincing
evidence), can the Court still find there was at least some
underpayment? Keep in mind that Slick may have had expenses at
least partially offsetting his drug receipts. How do you know
whether, on the one hand, Slick turned a profit (receipts exceeded
expenses), or whether, on the other hand, Slick lost money or broke
even (expenses equal or exceeded receipts) in 1991?
Hypothetical #3
The Court, impressed that drug dealers generally turn a
substantial profit (and hide it from the tax-man), concludes that
the "vastly greater probability" is that Slick turned a profit in
1991. In reaching that conclusion, the Court acknowledges that
2 To make this determination, the Court need not determine how
much of an underpayment there was.
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Slick likely had some cost of goods sold or other expenses, but
believes that those amounts--whatever they were--were less than
$400,000. Thus, the Court concludes that, by clear and convincing
evidence, there was at least some underpayment.
Suppose that, in addition to determining that "at least some
part" of the underpayment is fraudulent, R determines that the
entire underpayment is fraudulent. This means that R must show, by
clear and convincing evidence, the amount of the underpayment.
(Again, Slick concedes fraudulent intent.) Can the Court find, by
clear and convincing evidence, an underpayment of any particular
amount? If so, what clear and convincing evidence did you find as
to the exact amounts of receipts and expenses? If not, is that
finding inconsistent with the earlier finding that there was at
least some underpayment?
T.C. Memo. 1993-184
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
WILLIAM FRANKLIN, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 15188-89. Filed April 26, 1993.
Petitioner pled guilty to conducting a continuing
criminal enterprise involving heroin sales for the
period June 1982 through mid-July 1987 and to willfully
making a false return by failing to include income and
expenses from heroin distribution in his 1983 Federal
income tax return. Respondent determined deficiencies
and additions to tax for petitioner's taxable years
1982 and 1983 relating to unreported narcotics income.
Petitioner challenged the deficiency notice on the
grounds that it was arbitrary.
1. Held: The notice of deficiency is
nonarbitrary as to both 1982 and 1983.
2. Held, further, petitioner is liable for
deficiencies and additions to tax under sec. 6661,
I.R.C., for both 1982 and 1983.
3. Held, further, respondent carries her burden
of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, some
underpayment for both 1982 and 1983. Respondent also
carries her burden of proving, by clear and convincing
evidence, petitioner's fraudulent intent for each year.
Accordingly, we sustain the additions to tax under sec.
6653(b)(1), I.R.C., for 1982 and 1983.
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4. Held, further, respondent proves, by clear and
convincing evidence, an underpayment attributable to
unreported income of $500, for both 1982 and 1983. See
Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1930).
Accordingly, we sustain the additions to tax under
sec. 6653(b)(2), I.R.C., for both 1982 and 1983, with
respect to the underpayment attributable to unreported
income of $500.
Robert M. Simels, for petitioner.
Robert A. Walker, Jr., and Mary Corrizan Gorman, for
respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
HALPERN, Judae: Respondent determined deficiencies in
petitioner's Federal income tax and additions to tax as follows:
Additions to Tax
Year Deficiency Sec. 6653(b)(1) Sec. 6653(b)(2) Sec. 6661
1982 $155,214 $ 77,607 50% of the $38,804
interest due
on $155,214
1983 213,767 106,884 50% of the 53,442
interest due
on $213,767
The deficiency notice explained the determinations as being based
on receipt of $305,245 and $423,611 in unreported income from
heroin sales in 1982 and 1983, respectively. Petitioner has
challenged the determinations and additions to tax.
Unless otherwise noted, all section-references are to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 in effect for the years in issue,
and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice
and Procedure.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts are stipulated and are so found. The
stipulations of fact filed by the parties and attached exhibits
are incorporated by this reference.
Petitioner was incarcerated in the Federal Correctional
Institution in Memphis, Tennessee, when he filed the petition in
this case.
Criminal Convictions
In 1977, petitioner was convicted in the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland of conspiracy to
distribute heroin. Petitioner pled guilty to conspiracy and
subsequently was sentenced to a 12-year prison term. Petitioner
served a portion of his sentence in a Federal penitentiary and
was released to the Volunteers of America Halfway House in
Baltimore, Maryland, in June 1982. On July 17, 1987, pursuant to
a superseding indictment, petitioner was indicted by a Federal
grand jury on 28 counts of narcotics and Internal Revenue Code
violations. Petitioner pled guilty to counts 9, 12, and 23 of
the superseding indictment and is currently serving a
nonparolable sentence of 10 years.
With regard to the superseding indictment, count 23 charged
petitioner with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and
is not relevant to the present case. Count 12 charged petitioner
with violating section 7206(1) by willfully making a false return
by failing to include in his 1983 Federal income tax return gross
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income and expenses from the business of distributing heroin.
Count 9 charged petitioner as follows:
A. From in or about June, 1982, and continuing
thereafter up to and including the date of this
Indictment, in the State and District of Maryland,
defendant
WILLIAM E. FRANKLIN
did unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally engage in a
Continuing Criminal Enterprise in that he did on
numerous occasions violate Title 21, United States
Code, Section 841 (a)(1), which violations, including,
but not limited to, those set forth in Counts One, Two,
Three, Four, Five, and Eight of this Indictment, were
part of a continuing series of violations of said
statute undertaken by the said Defendant in concert
with at least five other persons, with respect to whom
WILLIAM E. FRANKLIN occupied a position of organizer,
supervisor or other position of management, and from
which continuing series of violations WILLIAM E.
FRANKLIN obtained substantial income and resources.
B. From his engagement in the aforesaid
Continuing Criminal Enterprise, the Defendant WILLIAM
E. FRANKLIN obtained property, profits and interests
which are subject to forfeiture to the United States,
including, but not limited to approximately $44,080
United States currency seized from WILLIAM E.
FRANKLIN'S home at 6713 Yataruba Drive, Baltimore,
Maryland, on November 15, 1983 by agents of the United
States. 21 U.S.C. section 848.
The counts referred to in count 9 charged petitioner as follows:
Count 1 charged petitioner with conspiring to distribute heroin
from at least January 1980 to the date of the indictment.
Counts 2 through 5 charged petitioner with distributing
approximately 50-dosage unit bags of heroin on each of four
occasions in Maryland during a period beginning in or after
June 1982 and ending in or before November 1982. Count 8 charged
distribution of 1500-dosage unit bags of heroin in Maryland on or
before October 7, 1983. Section 848 of title 21, U.S.C. (1988),
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whose violation forms the gravamen of count 9, is commonly known
as the "Drug Kingpin Statute". See United States v. Johnson, 575
F.2d 1347, 1358 (5th Cir. 1978).
Prior to the District Court's accepting petitioner's plea
agreement with regard to the superseding indictment, petitioner
was rearraigned in the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland on February 22, 1988. In anticipation of
the court's accepting petitioner's plea agreement, counsel for
the United States represented to the court that, if the case were
to go to trial, the United States would show that petitioner,
either alone or in conjunction with another, did on numerous
occasions in 1982 and on at least one occasion in 1983 distribute
heroin. Also, counsel for the United States represented that the
United States at trial would be able to show that petitioner's
1983 Federal income tax return falsely failed to disclose income
from an ongoing business of heroin distribution. Petitioner's
counsel conceded that the United States would be able to obtain a
conviction on the three counts to which petitioner was prepared
to plead. Petitioner's counsel objected to the court, however,
that the United States could not establish through the testimony
of the witnesses who had been made known to petitioner that
petitioner had been engaged in any criminal activities with them
or with anyone else. Petitioner's counsel stated that such
witnesses had recanted their prior allegations. Nevertheless,
petitioner's counsel agreed with the court that guilt could have
been proven by the "accumulation of the totality of the
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evidence", wholly apart from whether it could be proven by the
witnesses in question. The court asked petitioner why he was
pleading guilty. Petitioner first answered ambiguously: "Well,
Your Honor, one of the main reasons is because I'm dealing with
my inner self. Sometimes, you know, a person reaches a stage in
their life where they have to set themselves free, and by doing
so it calls for a sacrifice. So yes, I just wanted to make that
statement." Then, in response to the court's further question as
to whether petitioner believed that the United States could prove
its case and that is why petitioner was pleading guilty,
petitioner answered: "Yes, Your Honor." The court accepted the
plea agreement. The court convicted petitioner of the counts to
which he had pled guilty and sentenced him to prison for
10 years. The judgment of the court was filed on May 13, 1988.
Petitioner's Tax Returns
Petitioner filed his Federal income tax return for 1982 on
April 4, 1983. He filed his Federal income tax return for 1983
on April 16, 1984. Petitioner reported no income related to
heroin sales on either return. On March 31, 1989, respondent
issued the notice of deficiency here at issue, determining that
petitioner had unreported income from heroin sales for 1982 and
1983 in the amounts of $305,245 and $423,611, respectively. That
notice provides no further information about such items of income
and, in particular, no basis for determining how such amounts
were calculated. A petition to this Court timely was made and a
trial was held on January 16 and 18, 1991. At that trial,
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petitioner's only witness was Gregory Welsh, Esq., Assistant
United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney,
Baltimore, Maryland. Mr. Welsh's testimony related primarily to
records of petitioner's that had been seized and Mr. Welsh's
activities preparatory to petitioner's 1988 conviction.
Petitioner did not testify. In response to a question by the
Court, petitioner's counsel stated that it was petitioner's view
that petitioner's returns spoke for themselves and that
Mr. Welsh's testimony was offered only to corroborate that the
documents that supported those returns had been seized by the
Government and had at some point, in some way, been used by the
Government. Counsel further stated that the only remaining issue
was whether the Government could demonstrate that petitioner had
income beyond that shown on the returns. Counsel insisted that
the Government could not, and that the plea that resulted- in
petitioner's 1988 conviction was not evidence that petitioner had
additional income but was part of a resolution of the case that
needed to be made to satisfy the various agencies involved.'
Respondent also called Mr. Welsh, whose testimony was
elicited in support of respondent's fraud case. Respondent
presented no other witnesses. No witness testified as to how
respondent calculated the unreported income items here at issue
1 Counsel for petitioner expressed this fundamental point in
additional ways in response to questions from the Court. E.g.,
he responded that the Government had failed in its proof and thatit had shown no basis for the deficiency other than that it sent
out a deficiency notice.
- 8 -
or as to how respondent determined that petitioner underreported
his income or underpaid his tax for the years here in question.
OPINION
Petitioner asserts that respondent's notice of deficiency is
without foundation and is inherently arbitrary. Accordingly,
petitioner argues that the notice of deficiency constitutes a
"naked assessment", which is "invalid" within the rule of
Helverinq v.- Taylor, 293 U.S. 507 (1935) .2 See United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 441 (1976). Petitioner continues that,
respondent having failed otherwise to offer any basis for her
calculations or contentions that was not rebutted by petitioner,
this Court should redetermine deficiencies in tax to be zero and
sustain no section 6661 additions to tax. Petitioner further
argues that respondent has failed to carry her burden of proving
fraud by clear and convincing evidence. See sec. 7454(a);
Rule 142(b).
2 To hold that a deficiency notice is invalid within the rule
of Helverinq v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507 (1935), because it
constitutes a "naked assessment", is not to hold that it is
invalid in the usual sense or that this Court lacks jurisdiction
over such notice. See Suarez v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 792, 814
(1972), overruled as to another issue Guzzetta v. Commissioner,
78 T.C. 173 (1982) ("Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507 (1935),
teaches that when a petitioner makes a showing casting doubt on
the validity of a deficiency determination, the statutory notice
itself is not rendered void; the result of such showing is that
the respondent must then come forward with evidence to establish
the existence and amount of any deficiency."). To avoid
confusion, we will refer to a notice of deficiency held to
constitute a naked assessment as being "arbitrary".
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I. Arbitrariness of Respondent's Determinations
Petitioner seeks to show that respondent's determinations
are arbitrary and, hence, come within the rule of Helvering v.
Taylor, supra. The rule of HelverinQ v. Taylor, supra, may be
simply put: a court is given sufficient cause to set aside
respondent's determination of a deficiency if it is shown to the
court that such determination was arbitrarily made. Id.
A. Unreported Income from an Unlawful Activity
In a case involving unreported income from an unlawful
activity, where the Commissioner rests on the presumption of
correctness that is said to attach to her determination, the
presumption generally will fail if the taxpayer can show that the
Commissioner has failed to link him with some illegal tax-
generating act (such as the purchase or sale of a controlled
substance). See Shriver v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 1, 3 (1985).
However, the Commissioner need not link the taxpayer to an
unlawful income-generating activity to the extent that she can
connect the taxpayer to unexplained cash or deposits. Tokarski
v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 76 (1986). Here, at least, such
connection would explain only part of respondent's claim, so we
will continue our inquiry as to petitioner's linkage to the
unlawful activity in question.
A taxpayer has made a sufficient showing that the
Commissioner has failed to link him with some tax-generating
unlawful activity if he establishes that the Commissioner has
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shown merely a peripheral contact with illegal conduct. Llorente
v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981), affg. in part and
revg. in part 74 T.C. 260 (1980). The taxpayer has made an
insufficient showing if it is established that his involvement
with an unlawful activity is direct enough to support the
inference that he received or used funds in the course of his
engagement in that activity. Id.; see DeCavalcante v.
Commissioner, 620 F.2d 23 (3d Cir. 1980), affg. Barrasso v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1978-432 (supervision and control of
gambling operations); Avery v. Commissioner, 574 F.2d 467 (9th
Cir. 1978), affg. T.C. Memo. 1976-129 (selling drugs to a
Government agent); Carson v. United States, 560 F.2d 693 (5th
Cir. 1977i (running a wagering business); Gerardo v.
Commissioner, 552 F.2d 549 (3d Cir. 1977), affg. in part and
revg. in part T.C. Memo. 1975-341 (collecting gross wagering
receipts); Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.
1969) (running a wagering business).
Here, petitioner argues that respondent failed to link him
to any income-generating activity. Accordingly, petitioner would
conclude, respondent's determinations of deficiencies are
arbitrary and any presumptions of correctness that would attach
to such determinations fail. Respondent's only witness was
Assistant United States Attorney Welsh, whose testimony went to
respondent's fraud case, and who testified to petitioner's
criminal activities. Stipulated into the record by both parties,
however, are the superseding indictment of petitioner and
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petitioner's guilty pleas to counts 9, 12, and 23 of that
indictment. Thus, we must consider whether that evidence is
sufficient to link petitioner to the alleged income-generating
activities during the periods covered by the deficiency notice.
Petitioner pled guilty to count 9 of the superseding
indictment, charging him with conducting a continuing criminal
enterprise over a 5-year period, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
section 848. Elements of engaging in a continuing criminal
enterprise include, among others, a supervisory or management
role in a criminal enterprise (including heroin distribution) and
the obtaining of substantial income or resources from such
enterprise. 21 U.S.C. sec. 848(c) (1988). Specifically, count 9
charged a continuing series of violations of 21 U.S.C. section
841(a)(1) (distribution or possession with intent to distribute a
controlled substance) occurring throughout the period June 1982
to July 17, 1987, from which petitioner obtained substantial
income. Count 9 referred to but did not limit such violations to
those charged in counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 8 of the superseding
indictment. Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 8 charged petitioner with
specific acts of distributing large amounts of heroin in 1982 and
1983. Specified in count 9 as property, profits, and interests
from that continuing criminal enterprise subject to forfeiture is
$44,080 seized from petitioner in 1983. In addition, petitioner
pled guilty to count 12, charging him with willfully making a
false return by failing to report substantial gross income and
expenditures relating to heroin sales on his Federal income tax
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return for 1983. On the surface, therefore, counts 9 and 12 of
the superseding indictment and petitioner's guilty pleas thereto
clearly link him to illegal income-generating activities during
1982 and 1983.
Petitioner points out that Gregory Welsh, the Assistant
United States Attorney prosecuting his criminal case, testified
that, had petitioner not pled guilty, the Government need only
have proved at trial three income-generating felony drug
violations occurring sometime in the period covered in count 9
(mid-1982 to mid-1987) in order to obtain a conviction.
Petitioner argues that the Government could have proved three
violations occurring during years not here in issue. Therefore,
continues petitioner, neither count 9 nor his guilty plea thereto
relate directly enough to illegal unreported income in 1982 and
1983, the. periods-covered by the deficiency notice, for the
deficiency notice to be considered nonarbitrary.
Such an argument pertains more to the applicability of
collateral estoppel than to whether the notice of deficiency can
be said to be arbitrary. Petitioner was not charged with, and
did not plead guilty to, a crime that merely placed him in
peripheral contact with illegal activity for the period covered
by the deficiency notice. See Llorente v. Commissioner, suvra.
On the contrary, count 9 charged that petitioner participated in
an illegal, income-generating activity during the last half of
1982 and all of 1983. Pursuant to count 9, petitioner was
charged with occupying "a position of organizer, supervisor or
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other position of management" in connection with a continuing
criminal enterprise, and it was charged that he "obtained
substantial income and resources" therefrom. Specific acts of
heroin distribution during 1982 and 1983 were charged.
Petitioner pled guilty to, and was convicted of, counts 9 and 12.
Together, the superseding indictment, guilty plea, and conviction
are sufficient to support an inference linking petitioner to
illegal income-generating activities during 1982 and 1983, the
tax years covered by the deficiency notice. Unless rebutted,
that inference is sufficient to support the presumption of
correctness said to attach to respondent's determination of a
deficiency, so long as such determination is not rendered
arbitrary by petitioner's showing that respondent has plucked the
income figures in question out of the blue. See Llorente v.
Commissioner, suvra.
B. The Arbitrariness of the Amounts in Question
In evidence here is respondent's notice of deficiency,
determining that petitioner had unreported income from heroin
sales for 1982 and 1983 of $305,245 and $423,611, respectively,
but offering no explanation of how those amounts were determined.
Respondent's only witness at trial, Assistant United States
Attorney Welsh, shed no light on that question, nor does any
document or fact stipulated into evidence. Accordingly,
petitioner contends that those deficiencies are arbitrary. See
Helverinq v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507 (1935); Gasper v. Commissioner,
225 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1955), revg. and remanding Memorandum
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Opinions of this Court dated June 30 and Nov. 25, 1953. In other
words, petitioner asks us to infer the lack of a rational basis
for respondent's deficiencies from her failure to demonstrate the
same. That we cannot do, because the burden of proof is on
petitioner to demonstrate the arbitrariness of respondent's
deficiencies, Shriver v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 1, 3 (1985) to
draw such inference from respondent's inaction would be
tantamount to placing the burden of proof, as to that issue, on
respondent--which we are not at liberty to do. Beyond
emphasizing respondent's failure to come forward with an
explanation of her deficiencies, petitioner has produced no
evidence of arbitrariness. We are therefore constrained to
conclude that petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving
respondent's deficiencies to be arbitrary. See id.
We would point out that the circumstances of this case are
unusual, inasmuch as we have been favored with but a paucity of
evidence on which to base a determination as to the possible
arbitrariness of respondent's deficiencies. If respondent's
deficiencies indeed are arbitrary, as petitioner contends,
petitioner might, for instance, have adduced evidence of that
fact through the service of interrogatories on respondent
requesting an explanation of how the deficiencies were computed.
Had petitioner (as suggested or otherwise) required respondent to
advance an explanation for her deficiencies, this Court would
have been in a position to scrutinize that explanation; and if
that explanation proved unsatisfactory, there would have been
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evidence from which we would have concluded that respondent's
deficiency figures were arbitrarily derived and therefore placed
the burden of going forward with the evidence on respondent.
HelverinQ v. Taylor, surra; Gasper v. Commissioner, supra;
Shriver v. Commissioner, supra. Whether the evidence petitioner
might have adduced would have been sufficient to make his case,
as to arbitrariness, we do not know. What we know for certain,
however, is that, in the absence of such evidence, petitioner
cannot prevail.
C. Petitioner's Guilty Pleas
Finally, petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were
motivated by a desire to protect his family and their home and
for personal reasons concerning his "inner self", which alleged
motivation diminishes the reliability of the pleas to link him
with unreported illegal income. We find that argument
unpersuasive. In response to the District Court's question as to
whether petitioner believed that the United States could prove
its case and that was why petitioner was pleading guilty,
petitioner answered "Yes, Your Honor." We will not speculate as
to what else may have motivated petitioner. Moreover, we put
little stock in recantations by confederates of petitioner and by
others concerning criminal activities of petitioner. Those
individuals were not before this Court to be cross-examined or
otherwise questioned about their statements. In brief,
petitioner has tried to convince us that petitioner's convictions
do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that petitioner engaged
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in income-generating activities from drug sales during the years
here in issue so as to support respondent's determinations of
deficiencies. However, an inference can be drawn of such
activities from the superseding indictment, petitioner's guilty.
plea, and his conviction. For all those reasons, the notice of
deficiency supported by the superseding indictment and
petitioner's guilty plea cannot be said to be arbitrary and
without rational foundation.
II. Petitioner's Failure to Carry the Burden of Proof
It is well settled that, except where otherwise provided in
the Internal Revenue Code or the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure, the burden of proof rests with petitioner. See
Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933). Where the
burden so rests, failure to carry the burden results in our
sustaining the determination made by respondent. By petitioner's
failure to call witnesses other than Assistant United States
Attorney Welsh, from the statement by his counsel at trial that
his returns spoke for themselves, and from the position he has
taken on brief, it is clear that petitioner is making no attempt
to carry the burden of proof. We interpret petitioner's position
with regard to the deficiencies as a general denial. A general
denial is insufficient to carry the burden of proof. See
Anastasato v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 884, 888 (3d Cir. 1986),
vacating T.C. Memo. 1985-101; Avco Delta Corn. v. United States,
540 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1976). Accordingly, since we have
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determined respondent's determinations to be nonarbitrary, we
will sustain the deficiencies as determined.
III. Deficiencies and Section 6661 Additions to Tax
we have concluded that, with respect to deficiencies and the
section 6661 additions to tax for substantial understatements,
petitioner bears the burden of proving respondent's
determinations incorrect. We have also concluded that petitioner
has failed to carry that burden. Petitioner is thus liable for
the deficiencies and section 6661 addition to tax as determined
by respondent.
IV. Additions to Tax for Fraud
Respondent also determined that petitioner was liable for
additions to tax for fraud for 1982 and 1983 under section
6653(b)(1) and (2).
A. Section 6653(b)(1)
Section 6653(b)(1) imposes an addition to tax equal to
50 percent of any underpayment in tax if any part of such
underpayment is due to fraud. To prevail under section
6653(b)(1), it is well established that respondent must show
both: (1) That the taxpayer has underpaid his taxes for each
year, and (2) that some part of the underpayment is due to fraud.
DiLeo v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 858, 873 (1991), affd. 959 F.2d 16
(2d Cir. 1992); Parks v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 654, 660-661
(1990); Truesdell v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1280, 1301 (1987);
Hebrank v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 640, 642 (1983). A conviction
for willful falsification under section 7206(1) does not estop a
- 18 -
taxpayer from denying fraud, Wright v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 636,
643 (1985), nor is it necessary to a conviction under that
section that the falsification result in the underpayment of tax,
Goodwin v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 215, 229 (1979), overruled as to
another issue Wright v. Commissioner, supra; Considine v.
Commissioner, 68 T.C. 52, 60 (1977), overruled as to another
issue Wriqht v. Commissioner, surra.
1. Existence of An Underpavment
The first inquiry under section 6653(b)(1) is whether any
underpayment exists. As relevant to this case, section
6653(c)(1) defines an "underpayment" for purposes of section 6653
as a "deficiency" defined under section 6211. Nevertheless, we
must keep in mind that respondent bears the burden of proving
fraud, which burden she must carry by clear and convincing
evidence. Sec. 7454(a); Rule 142(b); DiLeo v. Commissioner,
supra ("clear and convincing" standard applies both to fraudulent
intent and to existence of underpayment); Parks v. Commissioner,
supra, at 663-664 (same); Hebrank v. Commissioner, supra (same).
Our failure to redetermine a deficiency does not necessarily mean
that there is clear and convincing evidence of an underpayment.
As we stated in Parks v. Commissioner, supra at 660-661:
Where, as here, respondent has prevailed on the issue
of the existence of a deficiency by virtue of a
taxpayer's failure to carry his burden of proof,
respondent cannot rely on that failure to sustain his
burden of proving fraud. We must be careful in such
cases not to bootstrap a finding of fraud upon a
taxpayer's failure to prove respondent's deficiency
determination erroneous. * * * [Citations omitted.]
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Here, respondent has presented little evidence in support of the
particular deficiencies she has determined. Petitioner has, in
effect, presented no evidence in support of the errors he has
assigned to respondent's determination; as a result, we have
declined to redetermine those deficiencies because petitioner has
failed to carry his burden of proof. See supra sec. II;
Rule 142(a). To find an underpayment for purposes of satisfying
the first part of the section 6653(b)(1) test, we must examine
the evidence that exists and determine whether, for each year, it
clearly and convincingly demonstrates an underpayment. If it
does, then, for that year, the first part of the section
6653(b)(1) test would be satisfied, and it would be appropriate
for us to turn our attention to the second part of that test.
a. Receipts
Although respondent has offered little to substantiate the
particular deficiencies she has determined, she has adduced
substantial evidence that there were unreported receipts in both
1982 and 1983. Respondent has introduced into evidence count 9
of the superseding indictment, to which petitioner pled guilty,
charging that, from approximately June 1982 to July 1987,
petitioner engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise. Count 9
(incorporating counts 2 through 5 and count 8 of the superseding
indictment) further charges that such enterprise included
distributing 50-dosage unit bags of heroin on four occasions
between June 1982 and November 1982 and distributing 1500-dosage
unit bags of heroin on or before October 7, 1983. Last, count 9
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charges that petitioner "obtained substantial income and
resources" and "obtained property, profits and interests"
(including $44,080 in cash, forfeited under 21 U.S.C. section 848
and seized on November 15, 1983)-from such enterprise.
Respondent also directs our attention to count 12, to which
petitioner pled guilty, charging that petitioner willfully made a
false return by failing to include gross income and expenses from
heroin distribution activities on his 1983 Federal income tax
return.
We think the foregoing adequate to conclude, by clear and
convincing evidence, that petitioner had some unreported receipts
from heroin distribution activities in both 1982 and 1983.
b. Undervavment
The existence of unreported receipts does not, however,
demonstrate that petitioner underpaid tax in either. 1982 or 1983.
Indeed, in a merchandising business, gross receipts from sales
must be reduced by cost of goods sold to determine gross income
from sales. Sec. 1.61-3(a), Income Tax Regs. Moreover, gross
income from sales must be reduced by all deductible expenses
(including salaries, commissions, etc.) to determine taxable
income from sales. See sec. 63(a). Thus, an underpayment of tax
resulting from unreported gross receipts from sales is possible
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only if such unreported gross receipts are not exceeded by cost
of goods sold and deductible expenses.
3
Nevertheless, even in criminal tax evasion cases, where the
Government bears the greater burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, it is well settled--"that evidence of unexplained receipts
shifts to the taxpayer the burden of coming forward with evidence
as to the amount of offsetting expenses, if any." Siravo v.
United States, 377 F.2d 469, 473 (1st Cir. 1967). Accord, e.g.,
United States v. Garquilo, 554 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1977); Elwert
v. United States, 231 F.2d 928, 933 (9th Cir. 1956); United
States v. Link, 202 F.2d 592, 593 (3d Cir. 1953); United States
v. Bender, 218 F.2d 869, 871 (7th Cir. 1955); Bourque v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1980-286 (applying the general rule to
cost of goods sold). Where a taxpayer has not entirely omitted
receipts from a particular activity from his return, the settled
rule is based on the presumption that the taxpayer, having no
desire to overpay tax, has reported all deductions and other
3 In this case, a showing of gross income would suffice to
demonstrate an underpayment, at least for 1983, because, for that
year, petitioner was entitled to no deductions or credits
respecting his illegal drug sales. Sec. 280E. Sec. 280E
disallows any otherwise allowable deduction or credit for amounts
paid or incurred with respect to the sale of certain controlled
substances such as the ones distributed by petitioner. Sec. 280E
deals only with deductions and credits, however, and does not
disallow exclusions from gross income on account of cost of goods
sold. S. Rept. 97-494, at 309 (1982). Sec. 280E is effective
for amounts paid or incurred after Sept. 3, 1982, in tax years
ending after such date. Id. Because such exclusions may equal-
(or exceed) gross receipts, however, a showing of gross receipts
is insufficient to demonstrate taxable income, even where, as
here, no deductions are available.
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offsetting amounts. See, e.g., United States v. Bender, supra at
871. Where the taxpayer has failed to file a return, or his
return shows no receipts from a particular activity, then the
assumption that he, more readily than respondent, has access to
evidence of deductions or other offsetting amounts makes the
nonexistence of such amounts a fair presumption, at least as an
initial matter and absent a satisfactory explanation of such
nonexistence or the production of some exculpatory evidence. See
Siravo v, United States, supra at 474.4
Here, petitioner has not carried his burden of coming forth
with evidence of expenses to offset unexplained receipts.
Indeed, petitioner argues that there is no evidence of any
4 Of course, a taxpayer may carry his burden of coming forth
with evidence of expenses to offset unexplained receipts. In
such a case, we have held that the presumption underlying the
settled rule loses all force. In Perez v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1974-211, there was substantial evidence demonstrating that
the taxpayer, who owned a furniture repair business, made cash
payments to various employees who insisted on such method of
payment in order to avoid reporting those payments on their
income tax returns, We therefore found a solid basis for the
assumption that the taxpayer had unclaimed deductions that could
have offset unreported gross income and demonstrated the absence
of any underpayment. We stated the general rule as follows:
"once the Government establishes the existence of unreported
income and allows the deductions claimed on the return, it does
not have the further burden of proving the negative that the
taxpayer did not have any additional deductions." Id.
Nevertheless, we declined to apply the general rule on the theory
that the underlying assumption of that rule--that the taxpayer
would not knowingly have failed to report all exclusions and
deductions--had been rebutted and therefore lost all force. See
also Rivera v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1979-343 (acknowledging
the propriety of declining to apply the general rule where the
underlying presumption is rebutted by evidence that the taxpayer
had unclaimed deductions that could have offset unreported gross
income but finding insufficient evidence of that kind in that
case).
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narcotics distribution activities by him during 1982 and 1983.
Consistent with that position, petitioner has not even attempted
to show costs or expenses of narcotics distribution activities
during those years or any records seized by the Government and
still in their possession that would show such costs or
expenses. Accordingly, having concluded, by clear and
convincing evidence, that petitioner had some unreported receipts
from heroin distribution activities in 1982 and 1983, we find
some underpayment of taxes for each such year. See Siravo v.
United States, supra; United States v. GarQuilo, supra; Elwert v.
United States, supra; United States v. Link, sup; United States
v. Bender, supra. The first part of the section 6653(b)(1) test
is satisfied.
Count 12 of the indictment to which petitioner pled guilty
in 1987 charged petitioner with violating sec. 7206(1) by
willfully making a false return by failing to include in his 1983
Federal income tax return gross income and expenses from the
business of distributing heroin. As stated, petitioner has made
the tactical decision to deny that he engaged in that activity
during 1982 or 1983 and (apart from the Government's ambiguous
concession in the indictment), therefore, has failed to adduce
evidence of such "expenses". We need not resolve any apparent
inconsistency, however, since, given the provisions of sec. 280E
(see supra note 3), petitioner would not, for 1983, be entitled
to any deductions for expenses incurred in connection with his
illegal drug sales. Although petitioner would not be precluded
by sec. 280E from taking account of any cost of goods sold (see
supra note 3), the terms of his indictment (and plea agreement)
are sufficiently ambiguous that we will not interpret his
conviction for violating sec. 7206(1) as a concession by
respondent that, indeed, petitioner did, in 1983, incur any cost
of goods sold.
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2. Fraudulent Intent
The second inquiry under section 6653(b)(1) concerns the
taxpayer's state of mind. The existence of a fraudulent state of
mind is a question of fact to be determined from the entire
record. See Recklitis v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 874, 909 (1988);
Meier v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 273, 297 (1988). As with the
existence of an underpayment (our first inquiry), respondent has
the burden of proof, which she must carry by clear and convincing
evidence. Sec. 7454(a); Rule 142(b). In sustaining her burden
of proof, respondent is not required to prove the precise amount
of the underpayment resulting from fraud, but only that "any
part" of the underpayment is attributable thereto. Otsuki v.
Commissioner, 53 T.C. 96, 105 (1969). Respondent must make such
showing for each taxable year involved. Id. An underpayment is
due to fraud if we find that the taxpayer intended to evade taxes
known to be owing by conduct intended to conceal, mislead, or
otherwise prevent the collection of such taxes. See Parks v.
Commissioner, 94 T.C. 654, 661 (1990); Truesdell v. Commissioner,
89 T.C. 1280, 1301 (1987); Hebrank v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 640,
642 (1983). Respondent need not establish that tax evasion was a
primary motive of petitioner, but may satisfy her burden by
showing that a tax-evasion motive played any part in petitioner's
conduct, including conduct also serving to conceal another crime.
Recklitis v. Commissioner, supra at 909. Fraudulent intent will
never be presumed, Beaver v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 85, 92 (1970),
but may, however, be proved by circumstantial evidence because
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direct proof of the taxpayer's intent is rarely available.
Recklitis v. Commissioner, supra at 910; Meier v. Commissioner,
supra at 297. The taxpayer's entire course of conduct may be
examined to establish the requisite fraudulent intent. Recklitis
v. Commissioner, supra; Meier v. Commissioner, supra.
Having considered all of the evidence before us, we conclude
that respondent, in addition to having satisfied her burden of
showing underpayments of tax by petitioner resulting from his
heroin distribution activities in 1982 and 1983, has satisfied
her burden of clearly and convincingly showing that such
underpayments were made with fraudulent intent.
a. 1983
As stated in section IV. A., supra, a conviction for willful
falsification under section 7206(l) does not estop a taxpayer
from denying fraud. Nevertheless, petitioner did plead guilty to
(and was convicted of) violating section 7206(1) by willfully
making a false return by failing to include in his 1983 Federal
income tax return gross income and expenses from his business of
distributing heroin. We have found that such activity gave rise
to an underpayment of income tax for 1983. Petitioner is thus
estopped from denying the willful falsity of his return with
regard to such underpayment. See Considine v. Commissioner, 68
T.C. 52, 68 (1977), overruled as to another issue WriQht v.
Commissioner, 84 T.C. 636, 643 (1985). We still must determine,
however, whether such willfulness was with intent to evade tax
known to be owing. We find that it was. Petitioner filed income
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tax returns showing substantial tax due for both 1982 and 1983,
thus demonstrating his cognizance of the duty to report income
and pay tax. Moreover, petitioner has not argued, nor would we
believe, that he thought those requirements to be excused in the
case of illegal income; and in any event, petitioner's conviction
under section 7206(1) would estop him from making that argument.
Nor would it matter if one of petitioner's motives for willfully
omitting income was to conceal his illegal drug-distribution
activity. See Recklitis v. Commissioner, supra at 909 (fraud may
be found even where tax evasion not the primary motive). In
light of all the facts and circumstances, we think tax avoidance
was at least one of the motivations behind petitioner's willful
underreporting of income in 1983. Accordingly, we conclude that,
for 1983, petitioner knew his income from the activity of heroin
distribution to be reportable and failed to report that income
with the intent to evade tax.6
b. 1982
Our analysis leads to the same conclusion for 1982,
notwithstanding the lack for that year of a conviction for
6 This plainly is not a case like that suggested by Judge
Featherston in his dissent in Goodwin v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.
215, 235 (1979)--a taxpayer willfully falsifying his return in
order to cover up the source of illegal income but likewise
omitting a legitimate deduction so as not to have an underpayment
or evade tax. In such a case it would be evident that the
taxpayer, who by design refrains from understating his tax, is
not driven (even in part) by a tax-evasion motive; in the case at
hand, petitioner has not refrained from understating his tax and
it is not at all evident that tax evasion was not a motivating
factor in the understatements at issue.
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violating section 7206(1). The facts are otherwise the same. As
discussed above, petitioner has demonstrated his cognizance of
the duty to report income and pay tax. Further, petitioner has
not argued, nor would we believe, that he thought those
requirements to be excused in the case of illegal income.
Accordingly, notwithstanding the absence of a conviction under
section 7206(1) for 1982, we conclude that petitioner willfully
failed to include in his 1982 Federal income tax return all
income from his drug-distribution activities. Thus, we are in
the same position respecting 1982 as we were respecting 1983 and
incorporate our above reasoning herein. Having considered
petitioner's entire course of conduct, we conclude that, for
1982, petitioner knew his income from the activity of heroin
distribution to be reportable and failed to report that income
with intent to evade tax.
3. Conclusion
Respondent has carried her burden of proving, by clear and
convincing evidence, for both 1982 and 1983 (1) some (any)
underpayment of tax, and (2) petitioner's fraudulent intent.
Accordingly, we sustain respondent's additions to tax under
section 6653(b)(1) for both 1982 and 1983.
B. Section 6653(b)(2)
We apply to section 6653(b)(2) a logic similar to that which
we have applied to section 6653(b)(1). Under section 6653(b)(2),
a separate addition to tax (equal to 50 percent of the interest
payable under section 6601) is determined with respect to "the
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portion" of the underpayment attributable to fraud. Again, we
must be wary not to bootstrap a finding of fraud, as to any
portion of the underpayment, on the taxpayer's failure of proof.
Respondent bears the burden of proving the specific portion of
the underpayment of tax that is attributable to fraud for
purposes of applying the section 6653(b)(2) addition to tax.
DiLeo v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 858, 873 (1991), affd. 959 F.2d 16
(2d Cir. 1992). Accordingly, to adjudicate an addition to tax
under section 6653(b)(2), first we must examine the evidence and
satisfy ourselves as to the amount that clearly and convincingly
is an underpayment. Then, we must determine whether any or all
of such amount clearly and convincingly is due to fraud. Only to
that extent can respondent prevail in her determination of an
addition to tax under section 6653(b)(2).
1. Amounts of Underoavment
As previously discussed (sec. I. B.), respondent has
provided us with little evidence of the amount of petitioner's
underpayments for 1982 and 1983. Nevertheless, we will deal
separately with each year.
a. 1982
In evidence is respondent's notice of deficiency,
determining that petitioner had unreported income from heroin
sales for 1982 of $305,245, but offering no explanation of how
that amount was determined. In her answer, respondent alleged
certain facts concerning petitioner's receipts from heroin sales,
costs of goods sold, and expenses, which support the calculations
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set forth in her notice of deficiency. Respondent moved to have
those allegations deemed admitted. Petitioner, however, denied
them, and, as a result, we denied respondent's motion.
Respondent has adduced scant evidence from which calculations of
petitioner's underpayment for 1982 could be found. That evidence
appears limited to counts 9, 12, and 23 of the superseding
indictment, to which petitioner pled guilty. Notably, however,
count 9 of the superseding indictment charges that petitioner
"obtained substantial income and resources" from a "continuing
series of violations" of 21 U.S.C. section 848 (the "Drug Kingpin
Statute"), beginning in approximately June of 1982. Accordingly,
we are compelled to find "substantial" unreported receipts for
1982 which, as explained above, would be deemed to be unreported
income. E.g., Siravo v. United States, 377 F.2d 469, 473 (1st
Cir. 1967) (burden on taxpayer to come forward with evidence of
offsetting expenses).
Respondent has failed to provide us with any guidance as to
what amount of receipts would be considered "substantial", as
that term is used in count 9 of the superseding indictment.
Thus, it is tempting to estimate petitioner's unreported receipts
at zero, or perhaps only a nominal amount, which estimate might
be justified by respondent's failure to prove any greater amount.
Such an estimate, however, would be inconsistent with the finding
that "substantial" sums were received. See Cohan v.
Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1930) ("But to allow
nothing at all appears inconsistent with saying that something
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was spent."). Accordingly, notwithstanding that the result will
be speculative, we must approximate petitioner's receipts as best
we can, bearing heavily upon respondent who bears the burden of
proof on this issue, which burden she must carry by clear and
convincing evidence. Secs. 6653(b)(2); 7454(a); Rule 142(b); see
Cohan v. Commissioner, surra at 544. Based on the evidence at
hand, we find that petitioner had unreported receipts, and
therefore unreported income, e.g, Siravo v. United States, supra,
of $500 in 1982. See Cohan v. Commissioner, suora.
b. 1983
Except with regard to the seizure of $44,080 from petitioner
during 1983 and the conviction under section 7206(1) for
willfully making a false return for 1983, the facts at issue with
regard to 1982 are similar to those at issue for 1983
(respondent's notice of deficiency determined that petitioner had
unreported income from heroin sales for 1983 of $423,611).
Notwithstanding that forfeiture and conviction, we will draw no
distinction between 1982 and 1983. Pursuant to count 9 of the
superseding indictment, the forfeited amount constituted
7 Five hundred dollars is not the maximum amount we consider
consistent with "substantial" unreported receipts from the
criminal activities engaged in by petitioner. Rather it is the
amount that, "bearing heavily * * * upon [respondent] whose
inexactitude is of [her] own making", we consider supported by
the evidence in this case. See Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d
540, 544 (2d Cir. 1930). That evidence does not support
(although it does not disprove) any greater amount. Accordingly,
respondent's failure to prove any greater amount does not bring
into question our determination of a greater deficiency, which
determination is based on Petitioner's failure of proof in that
regard.
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undifferentiated "property, profits and interests" from
petitioner's engagement in a criminal enterprise. The existence
of cash is dubious evidence of sales, however, and may in whole
or part represent petitioner's investment in his business rather
than his receipts therefrom.
Count 9 of the superseding indictment also charges that
petitioner "obtained substantial income and resources" from his
criminal activity in 1983, which, unlike the cash seized, clearly
constitutes receipts. Accordingly, petitioner had "substantial"
unreported receipts, and therefore unreported income, e.g.,
Siravo v. United States, supra, in 1983. Based on the evidence
at hand, we find that petitioner had $500 of unreported income in
1983. Cohan v. Commissioner, supra.
2. Fraudulent intent
Our above discussion of fraudulent intent, with regard to
section 6653(b)(1), is applicable here and will not be repeated.
It suffices to emphasize that petitioner has neither argued, nor
would we believe, that he thought the duty to report income and
pay tax excused in the case of illegal income. For the reasons
explained more fully above, we conclude that petitioner willfully
failed to report all income from his criminal activities in 1982
and 1983.
3. Conclusion
The "portion of the underpayment * * * attributable to
fraud" is the portion of the underpayment resulting from
unreported income of $500 in both 1982 and 1983. Thus, the
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addition to tax under section 6653(b)(2), for each year, is equal
to 50 percent of the interest payable under section 6601 with
respect to the underpayment resulting from unreported income of
$500.
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.
